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IN THE UTAH UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20050600-SC

vs.
WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court granted certiorari review of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision affirming
defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Paul G. Maughan presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to
consider the petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) & (5) (West 2004).
QUESTION PRESENTED
Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that a robber who feigns possession of a
gun by placing a hand in his pocket may be charged with aggravated robbery under Utah
law?

OPINIONS BELOW
The Utah Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Ireland, 2005 UT App 209,113 P.3d
1028, was issued May 12, 2005, and is attached as Addendum A. The Utah Court of
Appeals decision in the related case of State v. Johnson, 2005 UT App 210 (Memorandum
Decision), also issued May 12, 2005, is attached as Addendum B.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal and reproduced in full in Addendum
C:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Information dated December 9, 2003, with aggravated
robbery, a first-degree felony, and theft of services, a class B misdemeanor. R. 6-7. The
Information alleged that defendant robbed a downtown jewelry store on December 6,2003.
R. 6-8.
Defendant filed a motion to reduce the robbery charge from aggravated robbery to
simple robbery. R. 38. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and heard arguments on
March 17,2004. R. 114. The court denied the motion by minute entry on March 29, 2004,
R. 52, then issued a memorandum decision on April 2, 2004. R. 54-61 and Addendum E.
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Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to aggravated robbery on April 4, 2004,
specifically preserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to reduce the charge. R.
73.
On June 7,2004, defendant was sentenced to zero to 15 years in the Utah State Prison.
R.94.
On June 11, 2004, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
On May 12,2005, the Court of Appeals issued a published opinion upholding the trial
court's ruling that defendant was properly charged with aggravated robbery. See
Addendum A.
On July 8, 2005, defendant filed a timely petition for a writ of certiorari with this
Court. This Court granted the petition on October 24, 2005.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
"Bristly"
Other than needing a shave, defendant's appearance on the day he robbed a
Gateway Mall jewelry store was fairly ordinary. R. 114:17 (Transcript of Motion
Hearing, dated March 17, 2004, attached as Addendum D).
"I noticed that he had on a thick puffy coat and he had on a beanie," recalled
Jeffrey Reinkoester, a sales associate at the store. "I noticed that he was very bristly,
didn't shave in a day or two, and that he was coming very determined into the store." Id.
Reinkoester greeted defendant like any ordinary customer. But the response he
got was anything but ordinary.
3

"I want you to go and get me all the money in the cash drawer right now,"
defendant stated. R. 114:9. As defendant made this demand, he pointed at Reinkoester
with his right hand, which he kept concealed in the pocket of his coat.
"There was one hand in a pocket, gesturing like there was a gun," Reinkoester
recalled. R. 114:11.
"I'm not kidding," defendant added. "Hurry." R. 114:20.
"Do you want the change? "
Reinkoester immediately moved behind the counter toward the cash register. R.
114:20-21. Defendant tracked Reinkoester's movements and continued to point with the
hand in his pocket. R. 114:12, 13,21.
Reinkoester opened the cash register and began retrieving money. However, there
was not much in the till and defendant was not pleased. R. 114:13.
"Is that all you've got?" defendant asked after Reinkoester filled a bag with the
cash. Id.
"Yes," Reinkoester said. Then he held out a roll of quarters. "Do you want the
change?" Id.
Defendant replied: "Fill it with jewelry." Id.
Apparently changing his mind, defendant stated, "Just give it to me." He then took
the bag and ran to the front door. R. 114:15.
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The chase
Defendant, however, did not make a clean getaway. Nelson Fortier, the
storeowner, apparently realized a robbery was in progress and attempted to block
defendant's way. Id.
"Don't block the fucking door," defendant said, pushing Fortier out of the way.

Id;R.l.
Fortier allowed defendant to leave, but then chased after him. R. 114:15. Once
outside, defendant climbed into a cab, but Fortier told the driver not to leave because
defendant had just robbed the jewelry store. R. 7. Defendant then exited the cab and ran
off with Fortier still in pursuit. Id. Fortier finally caught up with defendant and
demanded he return the money. Defendant complied, then ran off again, but was later
arrested. Id. at 7-8.
The motion hearing
On March 17, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to reduce
the aggravated robbery charge to simple robbery. R. 114; Addendum D. Defendant
claimed that the aggravated robbery charge was not proper under Utah law because he
had not used or threatened to use a "dangerous weapon" as that term is defined. R. 3844.
In opposing the motion, the State argued that the aggravated robbery statutes,
when properly interpreted in light of Utah caselaw, cover situations in which non-verbal
conduct—such as defendant's coat-pocket pointing gesture—constitutes a

5

"representation" of a dangerous weapon, which is punishable just as if the defendant
actually possessed such a weapon. R. 42-44.
Reinkoester was the sole witness to testify at the hearing. His testimony was that
he believed defendant had a gun, even though he never saw one and even though
defendant did not verbally claim to have one.
Q. And after he said get me the money in the cash drawer, what did you do?
A. [by Reinkoester] I said all right. I circled around and came behind the cash
drawer and we met over there and I proceeded on getting the cash.
Q. Why did you do that?
A. Because I thought he had a weapon.
Q. Did he say he had a weapon?
A. No.
Q. What was it that led you to believe he had a weapon?
A. The motioning in the coat pocket.
R. 114:13.
Q. Why didn't you say anything to Dominique [another store worker]?
A. Fear
Q. Fear of what?
A. Fear of reprisal from the suspect.
Q. In what way?
A. Maybe being shot.
R. 114:27.
6

On April 2,2004, the trial i otirl issued a Memorandum Decision denying defendant's
motion. R. 54-60. See Memorandum Decision, Addendum E. The court stated:
It defies logic to allow a defendant to induce a victim to believe the
defendant has a weapon and thereby coerce a victim to perform some act
based on the defendants representations and then allow the defendant o
benefit when it is later shown the defendant in fact had no such weapon. The
Court finds in this case that the defendant's placement of his hand in his
pocket and the gesturing accompanying it, as testified to by the witness,
constituted a representation. Therefore, the State is within its discretion in
charging this matter as a first-degree felony.
R. 58.
The Utah Court of Appeals agreed. In rejecting defendant's claim that his conduct did
not meet the elements of aggravated robbery, the court of appeals held:
[W]e determine that Reinkoester reasonably believed that the "item [wasJ
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury"... Reinkoester testified that
he feared that if he did not comply with Ireland's request, he may be shot.
Guns by their very nature are capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury. Reinkoester's belief was based not only on the subjective belief that he
thought Ireland had a gun, but also on objective evidence. Reinkoester saw
something "pointing at [him]" inside Ireland's coat pocket. That something
"looked like a gun." This is sufficient objective evidence to support a
reasonable belief that one might have been injured if he or she did not comply.
Ireland, 2005 UT App 209 at \ 12, Addendum A.
SUMMARY OF A R G y M E ^

r

Point I: The plain meaning of Utah's aggravated robbery statutes support the court of
appeals' determination that defendant's use of his hand in his coat pocket to simulate a gun is
sufficient to meet the definition of aggravated robbery.

7

Point II: Relevant precedent from Utah and the vast majority of jurisdictions support
the interpretation of Utah's armed robbery statutes to encompass gestures such as
defendant's use of his hand in his coat pocket to simulate a gun.
Point III: An interpretation of Utah's armed robbery statutes that requires a victim to
confirm that a robber actually possesses a gun would be bad public policy because the
consequence of guessing incorrectly could be disastrous.
ARGUMENT
L

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
DEFENDANT'S USE OF HIS HAND IN HIS POCKET TO
SIMULATE A GUN WAS A "REPRESENTATION" OF A
"DANGEROUS
WEAPON55
WHICH,
THEREFORE,
CONSTITUTED AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.

Defendant claims that under Utah law, he cannot be found guilty of aggravated
robbery, even though he pointed toward the victim with his hand in his coat pocket in a
manner that is almost universally recognized to indicate the presence of a gun. "Even if a
concealed hand in the pocket qualifies as a representation under the first part of the statute, a
further representation, verbal or otherwise, that the robber will use the gun or objective facts
that make it reasonable to believe that the item is likely to cause death is required in order to
elevate the crime to aggravated robbery." Aplt. Br. at 5. A plain reading of Utah statutes
defining aggravated robbery shows defendant's claim is meritless.
In construing a statute, this Court must attempt to "'ascertain and effectuate the
Legislature's intent/" State v. Hunt, 906 R.2d 311,312 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). The
Legislature's intent and purpose is most often evident from the plain language of the statute.
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Id. If possible, ti

- . >ry language should be given a literal meaning. State v. Ewell, 886

P.2d 1260,1363 (Utah App. 1993). Where the plain language of statute is clear, there is no
need to look further. Lovendahlv. Jordan School District, 2002 I J' 1 130,, 11 58, 63 P.3d 705
(Durrant, J., concurring and dissenting willi two justices coilcurring); see also Okeefe v. Utah
State Retirement Board, 956 R.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998) (the term "overtime" is clear and
unambiguous and the court has "no need to resort to other methods of construction"); Visitor
Autk Info. Cntr. v. Customer Service Division, 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (I Jtah 1997) ("Unless
the statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find no need to delve into the uncertain
facts of legislative history"); Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick,
890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) ("When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be
held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction"). A reviewing court
should not add or subtract statutory terms. Reinkraut v. Shalala, 854 F. Supp. 838, 841 (D.
Utah 1994). "Under the plain meaning rule, we seek the meaning of the statute from its very
language, and if it is straightforward, we simply enforce it according to its terms. Its words
then bear 'their ordinary meaning and the statute is not to be read so as to add or subtract
from [that] which is stated. . 7" Gardener v. Chrysler Corp., 89 F.3d 729, 736 (10th Cir.
1996) (citation omitted).
Under Utah law, a person commits simple robbery if he or she "unlawfully and
intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the possession of another from his
person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a
purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently or tenlporarily of the personal property;
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. . . " Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (West 2004). By contrast, a person commits aggravated
robbery if in course of committing robbery, he "uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon
as defined in Section 76-1-601; . . ." Utah Code Ann § 76-6-302 (emphasis added).
"Dangerous weapon" means:
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of
the item leads the victim to reasonably believe
the item is likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury; or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or
in any other manner that he is in control of such an item.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-601(5) (West 2004) (emphasis added).
Under and plain meaning of the statute, defendant's admitted conduct constitutes
aggravated robbery. Clearly, the coat-pocket gesture was intended as a show of "force" to
create sufficient "fear" in Reinkoester that he would comply with defendant's demands.
And, because the coat-pocket gesture constitutes a show of force by conveying to a
reasonable person that the assailant has a gun, it also constitutes a "threat" for purposes of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary
2382 (1993), "threaten" means "to give signs of the approach of (something evil or
unpleasant): indicate as impending: portend".1 For Reinkoester—or, indeed, any store clerk

1

"In the case of unambiguous statutes, this court has a long history of relying on
dictionary definitions to determine plain meaning." State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, If 11, 992
P.2d 986 (Utah 1996).
10

or teller faced with such a coat-pocket gesture—the "approaching evil" was the possibility of
being shot with a "dangerous weapon."
A "dangerous weapon" is "any item capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury[] or ^facsimile or representation of the item." Utah ('ode \nn § 76-6-601(5)(a) &
(b). A facsimile, according to Webster's, is "an exact and detailed copy of something." Id.
at 813. For example, a toy gun or a replica of a gun would be a facsimile. There is no
allegation that defendant used a facsimile; rather, he is accused of using a "representation" of
a dangerous weapon. When defendant placed his hand in his pocket and pointed toward
Reinkoester, he intentionally represented that he had a dangerous weapon, to wit: a handgun.
He did so non-verbally by "portrayal or delineation. . . in a visible image or form." See
Webster's at 1926 (defining "representation").
Defendant's "use or apparent intended use of the item [led] the victim to reasonably
believe the item [was] likely to cause death or serious bodily injury;..." Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-60 l(5)(b)(I). Something is "apparent" if it is "capable of easy perception[;] readily
perceptible to the senses, esp sight[;J... Readily manifest to the senses or mind as real or
true and supported by credible evidence..." Webster's at 102. Defendant's coat-pocket
gesture has a meaning that is "readily perceptible": "I have a gun and I'm prepared to use
it." Indeed, Reinkoester testified that he complied with the demands precisely because he
believed defendant may have a gun concealed in his coat pocket and was pointing it at him
while demanding money and jewels.
Q. And after he said get me the money in the cash drawer, what did you do?
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A. [by Reinkoester] I said all right. I circled around and came behind the cash
drawer and we met over there and I proceeded on getting the cash.
Q. Why did you do that?
A. Because I thought he had a weapon.
Q. Did he say he had a weapon?
A. No.
Q. What was it that led you to believe he had a weapon?
A. The motioning in the coat pocket.
R. 114:13.
Q. Why didn't you say anything to Dominique [another store worker]?
A. Fear
Q. Fear of what?
A. Fear of reprisal from the suspect.
Q. In what way?
A. Maybe being shot.
R. 114:27.
Defendant does not contest that he committed simple robbery; rather, he claims there
were no aggravating factors because he did not possess, display or "represent" a "dangerous
weapon." In defendant's view, he simply walked into the jewelry store, stated "I want you to
go and get me all the money in the cash drawer right now" and Reinkoester was more than
happy to comply. R. 114:9.
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The problem is that defendant's version makes no sense logically or legally.
Salesmen do not ordinarily turn over cash and jewels upon demand; they do so only when
demands are backed up by a threat of harm, generally from some kind of weapon. By
ignoring or minimizing the significance of the coat-pocket gesture, defendant advocates a
view akin to the fabled "elephant in the room"—something everyone sees but refuses to
acknowledge. This Court need not turn a blind eye to the obvious. Under the plain meaning
of the statutes, defendant robbed the jewelry store by using the "representation" of a
"dangerous weapon" to threaten Reinkoester and force him to comply with defendant's
demands. Defendant is, accordingly, guilty of aggravated robbery and the court of appeals
properly affirmed his conviction.
II. DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
BECAUSE HIS NON-VERBAL CONDUCT CREATED THE
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE BELIEF THAT HE POSSESSED A
DANGEROUS WEAPON.
Defendant insists that if he could be convicted or aggravated robbery because he
placed his hand in his pocket to simulate a gun, the distinction between simple and
aggravated robbery would be lost because it would leave the aggravating factor—the
presence of a dangerous weapon—up to the "subjective reaction of the victim..." Aplt. Br.
at 18. "[B]y allowing the subjective reaction of the victim to play a role in determining
whether a defendant committed a simple or aggravated robbery, the court of appeals
disregarded this Court's concerns in Suniville and opened the door for inconsistent
application of the aggravated robbery statute based in part on a victim's predisposition for

13

anxiety, fear or embellishment rather than the objective conduct of the robbery." Id. (citing
State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987)).
Defendant is incorrect. Non-verbal conduct such as defendant's coat-pocket gesture
unequivocally—and objectively—communicates a threat with a dangerous weapon, as the
history of Utah's aggravated robbery statutes demonstrates. Indeed, the Legislature's
amendment of the statutes in the wake of Suniville demonstrates a clear intent to include
conduct such as defendant's non-verbal gesture within the definition of aggravated robbery.
Utah's aggravated robbery statutes were amended in 1989 following this Court's
Sunivilh decision, which held that a robber who feigns possession of a firearm could not be
convicted of aggravated robbery. In Suniville, the defendant, wearing a dark ski mask,
approached a bank teller, lifted his hand inside his coat pocket over the counter and pointed.
Suniville, 741 P.2d at 962. According to the teller, the gesture made it look "like he had a
gun," even though he did not say he had a gun and the teller did not see a gun. Id. The
robber said only: "This is a robbery, don't turn it into a homicide. Give me all your money."
Id. The teller complied and produced about $ 1,500, which the robber grabbed with his left
hand; his right hand remained in his pocket throughout. Id.
The trial court ruled that Suniville's actions fell within the ambit of Utah's aggravated
robbery statute, which at that time elevated the crime if the robber used "a firearm or a
facsimile of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly weapon . . . " Id. at 963-64
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(l)(a) (1987 version)). The trial court stated that "when
one uses any object with the intent to make the victim believe there is a gun and that the
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victim reasoiiabl} coiild believe there is a gun, that whatever object is being used is, in fact, a
facsimile of a firearm, whether it is a piece of pipe in the pocket or a plastic gun or even a
finger,..." Id.
This Court disagreed. Reversing Siiniville's conviction, the Court i loted that the term
"facsimile," which is defined as "'an exact copy, preserving all the marks of the original, 5 "
id. at 963 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 531 (rev. 5 th ed. 1979, and4th ed. 1968, at 706)),
cannot encompass defendant's "menacing gesture accompanied

u..A - nuoating the

presence of a gun." Id. at 965.
Nonetheless, the Court recognized the validity of cases from other jurisdictions that
interpreted broader statutory language to include the use of feigned weapons within the
definition of aggravated, robbei > Id. at 964. For example, the Court cited Breedlove v.
State, 482 So.2d 1277 (Ala.Crim.App.1985) and the Alabama aggravated robbery statute,
which stated that"' an article used or fashioned in a manner to lead any person who is present
reasonably to believe it to be a deadly weapon or dangerous instr i uiient, oi ai i> v erbal or
other representation by the defendant that he is then and there so armed, is prima facie
evidence . . . that he is so armed.'" Suniville, 741 P.2d at 964 (quoting Ala. Code § 13A-841(b) (1975)); see also State v. Hopson, 362 N.W.2d 166 (Wis, Ct. App.1984) (aggravated
robbery committed "'by use or threat of use of a dangerous weapon or any article used or
fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to believe that it is a dangerous weapon.
. .'") (quoting Wis. Stat. Ann. § 943.32(l)(b), (2) (1985)) (cited in Suniville, 741 P.2d at
964).
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In 1989, the Utah Legislature amended Utah's aggravated robbery statutes to cover
feigned weapons cases. The term "facsimile" was retained, but lawmakers added the broader
category of robbery committed through a "representation" of a dangerous weapon. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b). Under the new statutes, a person commits aggravated robbery
through use of a facsimile or representation of a dangerous weapon if he or she also either (1)
uses or apparently intends to use the item represented in a way that "leads the victim to
reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury;" or (2) "
represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b)(i) & (ii).
As argued in Point I, the plain language of the statutes covers feigned weapons cases
in which the bandit non-verbally "represents" possession of a dangerous weapon by placing
a hand or object in a pocket and pointing it at a victim. And, in fact, the language of the
statutes has been given expansive interpretation by this Court and the Utah court of appeals.
In State v. Hartmann, 783 P.2d 544 (Utah 1989), this Court recognized that simulated
or feigned weapons could fit the definition of a "dangerous weapon" under Utah law.
Hartmann was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and aggravated burglary after he broke
into a woman's apartment and raped her by claiming that he had a gun and would shoot her
children if they awoke and came to investigate. Id. at 545. Hartmann claimed that verbal
threats alone cannot be considered an aggravating circumstance. Id. at 546, 547. In
affirming Hartmann's conviction, this Court disagreed:
Threats may be communicated by action or conduct as well as by words... .
When a verbal threat of "death, or serious bodily injury to be inflicted
16

imminently on any person'' is made during the course of a rape or forcible
sodomy, the aggravated circumstance requirement .. .is fully satisfied.
Id. at 547 (internal citation omitted; emphasis added). The Court also noted that "threats are
particularly terrifying whether or not the perpetrator actually possesses a weapon." Id.
In State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277 (Utah App. 1995), the court oi appeals upheld
the aggravated robbery conviction of a defendant who told the victim he had a gun, although
he did not display a weapon or anything that appeared to be a weapon. Id. at 277. In the
opinion, the court carefully distinguished between a "facsimile," which is "an exact and
detailed copy", and "representation," which
is an expansive term, and, while it can mean "a likeness,
picture, model, or other reproduction," it can also refer to "a
statement or account especially] made to convey.. .[an]
impression of something with the intention of influencing . . .
action."
Candelario, 909 R.2d at 278 (citing Webster's Third New Int 7 Dictionary 813,1926 (1986))
(emphasis added). According to the court, "representation" has a variety of meanings which
include not only verbal representation, but also "a likeness, pitlmc, model ot other
reproduction." Id. Moreover, the court explicitly pointed out that, regarding the
representation concerning a "dangerous weapon" under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-601, "such a
statement can be either in the form of a verbal assertion or nonverbal action'' Id at n.2
(emphasis added). Thus, under the correct interpretation and application of Utah law,
defendant's use of his finger or other artifice during the course of the robbery was a
representation of a firearm in the sense that it was, at minimum, a "likeness, model or other
reproduction" of a gun. Id.; see also State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310,313-14 (1 Hah App. 1992)
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(affirming aggravated robbery conviction where defendant touched a bulge in his pants and
threatened to shoot).
The court of appeals' reasoning in Candelario is compelling and has been echoed in
other jurisdictions with similar aggravated robbery statutes. For example, in People v.
Taylor, 628 N.W.2d 55 (Mich. App. 2001), defendant claimed a fatal lack of "objective"
evidence to support his conviction for the armed robbery of a convenience store because he
merely held a hand inside his jacket and pants while telling the cashier "This is a stick up"
and "Open the [cash] drawer." Id. at 58. In Michigan, armed robbery is committed when the
robber is "armed with a dangerous weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to
lead the person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon..." Id. at 57
(citing Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.797). In affirming that defendant committed armed robbery by
placing his hand in his jacket and pants, the court stated:
While this portion of the armed robbery statute focuses on the belief of the
victim that the defendant was armed, that belief must be reasonable and our
courts have long recognized that the victim's subjective belief alone is
insufficient to support a conviction of armed robbery. . . . Therefore, the
prosecutor must submit "some objective evidence of the existence of a
weapon or article" to the finder of fact.
Id. at 59 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). The court found the evidence against the
defendant
went well beyond a mere subjective belief that defendant was armed during
the robbery. Rather, there was ample objective evidence that defendant either
had a gun or simulated one so as to deliberately lead complainant to
"reasonably believe" he had a gun. Complainant testified that, during the
robbery, defendant placed his hand inside his jacket and into the front of his
pants. Objectively, defendant could have carried a weapon under his jacket
and in his waistband.
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Id. at 61.
The court also explicitly rejected the defendant's contention that a gesture simulating
the presence of a weapon without more is insufficient to constitute armed i obbery.
[W]e decline to hold that a defendant must verbally threaten the victim with
some specific bodily harm in order to obtain a conviction of armed robbery.
If there is sufficient evidence that, during the course of the robbery, the
defendant simulates a weapon so as to induce the victim to reasonably believe
he is armed and, by word or conduct, threatens the victim by announcing a
robbery or otherwise suggesting the potential use of the weapon, then the
defendant may be convicted of armed robbery.
Id
This view is consistent with the majority of jurisdictions that have considered the
issue. See, e.g., Lynn Considine Cobb, Annotation, Robbery by Means of Toy or Simulated
Gun or Pistol, 81 A.L.RJd 100b. i oi example, in Faulkner v. State, 581 S.E.2d365 (Ga.
App. 2003), the defendant entered a tanning salon with a white sock covering his hand. As
he approached the cash register, an employee saw that the sock concealed something shaped
like a gun. Defendant pressed the sock into the employee's back anil told her to open the
register. The employee testified that something in the sock "felt like . . .a gun," that she
believed it was a gun and that she was afraid. Id. at 366-67. Defendant was convicted of
armed robbery—the taking of property of another from the person or the immediate presence
of another "by use of an offensive weapon, or any replica, article, or device having the
appearance of such weapon." Id at 367. The defendant claimed the evidence was insufficient
to sustain a conviction for armed robbery because there was no evidence of a weapon and no
evidence that the victim's apprehension was reasonable. Id. The appellate court disagreed,
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noting that although the defendant "may not have displayed a gun to the tanning salon
employee, the evidence authorized a finding that he used an article that had the appearance
of a gun to persuade her to comply with his demand and that his acts created a reasonable
apprehension on her part that he was threatening her with a gun." Id.
In State v. Arena, 663 A.2d 972, 978 (Conn. 1995), the court considered whether a
defendant convicted of robbery was entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction because
an object concealed in a plastic bag could have been something other than a gun. Witnesses
testified that the defendant approached a checkout counter and stated, "Put all the money in a
bag." At the same time, the defendant placed an opaque plastic shopping bag on the counter
and pointed it at the checker. The bag contained an object that was round and about 16
inches long, which the checker testified looked like a gun. Id. at 974. The defendant
requested a lesser-included-offense instruction based on testimony from one witness who, on
cross-examination, agreed that the object inside the bag could have been a club. Id. at 978.
The trial court denied the defendant's request for a lesser-included-offense instruction and
the Connecticut Supreme Court agreed. "The state only had to prove that the defendant
represented by his conduct that he had a firearm. The actual contents of the bag are
irrelevant. There is no evidence that the defendant represented by his words or conduct that
he had something other than a firearm." Id. (emphasis in original).
In People v. Lopez, 135 A.D.2d 443 (N.Y. App. 1987), defendant approached the
victim and stated, "[T]his is a stick up, give me your radio." At the same time, defendant
placed his hand inside his vest pocket, "as if he had a gun." Id. at 443. The victim, believing
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defendant had a gun, turned over his radio. Id. Defendant was tried and convicted of two
counts of robbery, one involving the use of a weapon. However, the trial court dismissed the
weapon-related count on motion from defendant because, even though defendant placed his
hand in his vest, "his hand never formed the shape of any object." Id. The New York
appellate court reversed. "Where an unarmed robber holds his hand in his pocket so as to
give the impression that he is holding a gun, he has '[d]isplay[ed] what appears to be . . . a
firearm' within the meaning of the statute.' Id. at 444.
In State v. Ellison, 819 P.2d 1010 (Ariz. App. 1991), the court held that defendant and
an accomplice were guilty of armed robbery because they were either "armed with a deadly
weapon or a simulated deadly weapon" or "use[d] or threatened] to use a deadly weapon or
dangerous instrument or a simulated deadly weapon." Id. at 1012 (citing Arizona Revised
Statues § 13- 1904(A)). "They committed the robberies by positioning their hands to make
their hands appear as if they instead were deadly weapons." Id. at 1013.
Despite clear Utah precedent recognizing that a robber's non-verbal representation
that he possesses a gun meets the definitional requirements of Utah's aggravated robbery
statutes—and despite the overwhelming concurrence of the majority of jurisdictions with
similar statutes—defendant persists. His principal complaint seems to be that the court of
appeals' Ireland opinion blurs the distinction between simple and aggravated robbery by
ignoring subsections (i) and (ii) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b). Defendant's position
seems to be that although a finger or object in a pocket may be a "representation" of a
dangerous weapon, thus satisfying section (b), it does not "lead the victim to reasonably
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believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury" (subsection (i)) or
"represent[] to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an
item" (subsection (ii)). Aplt. Br. at 18 (citing Ireland, 2005 UT App. 209 at 1Hf7-13).
Defendant comes to this conclusion by taking an unnecessarily narrow view of the
term "representation" and the gestures that may constitute representations. Defendant seems
to believe that if a coat-pocket gesture is deemed a "representation" of a gun, it cannot at the
same time communicate that the representation is likely to cause death or serious bodily
injury or "represent" that the robber is in possession of such a dangerous weapon. But
defendant provides no reason to construe the language so narrowly. A "representation" of a
dangerous weapon may also communicate that such a representation is "likely to cause death
or serious bodily injury."

A robber who employs such a "representation" is also

representing, "verbally or in [some] other manner," that he is in possession of the means to
cause serious bodily injury or death. Thus, contrary to defendant's claim that the Ireland
opinion ignores the two subsections, it actually shows that defendant's conduct meets both
subsections.
In support of this unnecessarily restrictive reading of Utah aggravated robbery
statutes, defendant cites cases from two jurisdictions—Kentucky and Michigan. See, e.g.,
Aplt. Br. at 9 (citing Williams v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1986)) and 17 (citing
People v. Banks, 563 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Mich. 1997); People v. Taylor, 628 N.W.2d 55
(Mich. App. 2001)). However, these cases are either irrelevant or unpersuasive. Williams is
a Kentucky case relied upon by this Court in Suniville in determining that the defendant's
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use of a feigned weapon could not constitute aggravated robbery. See Suniville, 741 P.2d at
965 (citing Williams, 111 S.W.2d at 712-13). However, the Kentucky statute analyzed in
Williams says nothing of "facsimiles" or "representations" or feigned weapons of any sort
and so is of little use in interpreting Utah's current aggravated robbery statutes. Also, the
1989 amendments to Utah's aggravated robbery statutes addressed the lacuna identified in
Suniville.
As for the Michigan cases, Defendant's reliance is misplaced given that authority
from that jurisdiction is more favorable to the State's position. Defendant cites the Michigan
cases in support of his claim that allowing a hand in a pocket to constitute a "representation"
of a dangerous weapon would improperly define aggravated robbery "based on the
subjective response of the victims,..." Aplt. Br. at 13. By contrast, "[i]n feigned weapons
cases, the Michigan courts have required an objectively reasonable belief that the robbery is
armed . . ." Aplt. Br. at 17. It is true that the Michigan courts have required objective
evidence to support the victim's belief that a robber is armed. See, e.g., Taylor, 628 N.W.2d
at 59. But it is also true that Michigan courts have recognized that a robber who reaches into
his jacket and into the front of his pants has offered objective evidence to support the
victim's belief that he had a weapon. Id. at 61. According to the court, such evidence
went well beyond a mere subjective belief that defendant was armed during
the robbery. Rather, there was ample objective evidence that defendant either
had a gun or simulated one so as to deliberately lead complainant to
"reasonably believe" he had a gun. Complainant testified that, during the
robbery, defendant placed his hand inside his jacket and into the front of his
pants. Objectively, defendant could have carried a weapon under his jacket
and in his waistband.
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Id.
The foregoing authority demonstrates that court of appeals correctly held that
defendant's "gesture of pointing his hand inside his coat pocket close to his right side with
his elbow extended constitutes a representation of a dangerous weapon ..." Ireland, 2005
UT App 209 at f 11. Moreover, "[t]his is sufficient objective evidence to support a
reasonable belief that one might have been injured if he or she did not comply" with
defendants demands. Id. at^|12. This conclusion is consistent with Utah precedent because
"[t]hreats may be communicated by action or conduct as well as by words...." Hartmann,
783 P.2d at 547 (emphasis added). A representation of a "dangerous weapon" under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-601 may take "the form of a verbal assertion or nonverbal action."
Candelario, 909 P.2d at 278 n.2 (emphasis added). Such non-verbal action provides "ample
objective evidence that defendant either had a gun or simulated one so as to deliberately lead
complainant to 'reasonably believe' he had a gun. . ." Taylor, 628 N.W.2d at 61.
Accordingly, the court of appeals decision and defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
III.

VICTIMS SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO VERIFY THAT A
WOULD-BE ROBBER IS ACTUALLY IN POSSESSION OF A
WEAPON.

In rejecting defendant's motion to reduce the charges against him from aggravated
robbery to simple robbery, the trial court made an important observation: "[I]t is not fair,
reasonable or wise to place the burden upon a witness to inquire whether or not a bulge in the
defendant's pocket is or is not a weapon." R. 58 (Memorandum Decision, Addendum E).
Other courts have voiced similar concerns about placing the onus on the victim to
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challenge the robber to prove that he actually possess a weapon. For example, in Aaron v.
Kelly, 65 F. Supp.2d 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), the court held that the defendant was properly
convicted under a New York statute that enhanced the crime of robbery if the robber
"[displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other
firearm.. rid. at 185 (citing N.Y.Penal Law § 160.10(2)(b)). The defendant was convicted
of sneaking into a dorm house and robbing two students. While fleeing from one of the
students, the defendant put his hand in his pocket and, in a "threatening manner," told the
student chasing him to be quiet. Id. at 184. In rejecting the defendant's claim that his
gesture alone was insufficient to constitute armed robbery under the statute, the court noted
that New York caselaw had long held that that"' display of anything that appears to be [a
firearm], though held inside a coat or otherwise obscured, is covered' by the law," thus
elevating the level of offense for displaying what appears to be a firearm. Id. at 187. The
court also stated that even if the student who pursued the defendant
was in fact uncertain as to whether [defendant] had a gun or a knife, that
would not affect the propriety of his conviction under New York law. "A
robbery victim is not, in our view, required to call a robber's bluff, in order to
allay any lingering uncertainty, before the armed offense is made out."
Id. at 187 (citingPeople v. Bynum, 125 A.D.2d207,209, 509N.Y.S.2d 321, 323 (1stDep't
1986), affd, 70 N.Y.2d 858, 523 N.Y.S.2d 492, 518 N.E.2d 4 (1987)).
The dangers of requiring a robbery victim to confirm that the hand or bulge in the
robber's pocket is an actual weapon are apparent. It is inevitable that the clerk who is
required to verify the existence of a weapon will end up injured or worse on the occasion
when it turns out that the robber has a real weapon. This Court should not adopt a policy that
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encourages such potentially disastrous confrontations.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the court of appeals decision in
Ireland and defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^TV\lay of January, 2006.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General
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Before BILLINGS, P.J., and DAVIS and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:

Holding: The Court of Appeals, Billings,
P.J., held that defendant's nonverbal gesture
of pointing his hand inside his coat pocket
close to his right side with his elbow
extended constituted representation of
dangerous weapon, so as to establish
aggravated robbery charge.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
Robbery €=^H
342kl 1 Most Cited Cases
Defendant's nonverbal gesture of pointing
his hand inside his coat pocket close to his
right side with his elbow extended
constituted representation of dangerous
weapon, so as to establish aggravated
robbery charge; dangerous weapon statute,
defining dangerous weapon as including
facsimile or representation of any item
capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury, included nonverbal gestures, gesture
was intended to look like gun for purpose of
influencing sales person to give defendant
all of the cash in cash drawer, and sales
person reasonably believed that item was

**1 Defendant William Joseph Ireland
(Ireland) appeals the trial court's judgment
convicting him of aggravated robbery under
Utah Code section 76-6-302. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-302 (2004). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
**2
On December 6, 2003, Jeffrey
Reinkoester (Reinkoester) worked as a sales
person in the Fortier jewelry store in the
Gateway Plaza in Salt Lake City. Ireland
entered the store wearing a thick, puffy coat
and a beanie. Reinkoester greeted Ireland
who responded, "I want you to go and get
me all the money in the cash drawer right
now. I'm not kidding. Hurry." As Ireland
made this demand, he pointed at Reinkoester
with his right hand, which he kept concealed
in the pocket of his coat. Ireland's hand was
held close to his right side with his elbow
extending behind him.
Reinkoester
observed that Ireland gestured like he had a
gun and described Ireland's hand in his coat
pocket as "pointing at [Reinkoester]."
Ireland's hand was "definitely gesturing like
there was a weapon, but it was more subtle."
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Ireland made no verbal statement that he had
a gun or weapon, and Reinkoester did *1029
not see a gun, but Reinkoester thought that
Ireland might have a gun due to Ireland's
gesturing in his pocket. Reinkoester thought
he may be shot if he did not comply with
Ireland's request.
**3 Reinkoester walked behind the counter
toward the cash drawer and put what little
cash the store had in a bag. The counter was
too high for Reinkoester to see Ireland's
hands, so Reinkoester could not tell if
Ireland had his hand in his pocket. Holding
up a roll of quarters, Reinkoester asked
Ireland whether he wanted the change and
Ireland responded, "[F]ill it with jewelry."
Before Reinkoester could fill the bag with
jewelry, Ireland said, "[J]ust give it to me,"
grabbed the bag, and ran to the front door.
**4 Meanwhile, Nelson Fortier (Fortier),
the storeowner, realized a robbery was in
progress.
Fortier exited the store and
attempted to block the doors so that Ireland
could not exit.
Ireland pushed and
eventually opened the door. Fortier chased
Ireland and demanded he return the money.
Ireland complied, then ran away, but was
later arrested.
**5 Ireland was charged with one count of
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony
pursuant to Utah Code section 76-6-302, and
theft of services, a class B misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code section 76-6-409.
See Utah Code Ann. $ § 76-6-302, -409
(2004). Ireland moved to reduce the charge
of aggravated robbery to simple robbery, a
second degree felony. After a hearing, the
trial court denied the motion.
Ireland
subsequently entered a conditional plea of
guilty to aggravated robbery, reserving the
right to appeal the denial of his motion.
Ireland now appeals.
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ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
**6 At issue is whether the trial court
properly interpreted Utah Code sections 766-302 and 76-1-601 in convicting Ireland of
aggravated robbery. We review the lower
court's interpretation of statutes for
correctness. See State v. Pixton, 2004 UT
App275,f 4,98P.3d433.
ANALYSIS
**7 Ireland argues that the trial court erred
by convicting him of aggravated robbery
pursuant to Utah Code sections 76-6-302
and 76-1-601 (the aggravated robbery and
dangerous weapon statutes respectively)
because there was insufficient evidence to
support the conviction. The aggravated
robbery statute provides that "[a] person
commits aggravated robbery if in the course
of committing a robbery, he ... uses or
threatens to use a dangerous weapon as
defined in Section 76-1-601." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-302. The dangerous weapon
statute defines "[djangerous weapon" as
including a "facsimile or representation" of
"any item capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury."
Id. §
76-160U5ya),(b). Moreover, "the actor's use or
apparent intended use of the item [must]
lead[ ] the victim to reasonably believe the
item is likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury." Id $ 76-1- 60U5Yb)(T).
**8 Utah courts have upheld convictions
for aggravated crimes when there has been
some kind of verbal representation or threat
that the defendant possessed a dangerous
weapon, even where the defendant did not
display the weapon. See State v. Hartmann,
783 P.2d 544, 547 (Utah 1989) (upholding
conviction for aggravated sexual assault
where defendant raped a woman while
telling her that he had a gun); State v.
Revos, 2004 UT App 15hTf 3, 91 P.3d 861
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(upholding aggravated robbery conviction
where defendant yelled, "Get the gun and
shoot," and "shoot to kill" during the
robbery but did not display a weapon); State
v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 277 (Utah
Ct.App.1995)
(upholding
sentence
enhancement for robbery where defendant
claimed to have a gun and threatened to kill
the cashier but did not display or gesture that
he had a weapon); State v. Adams, 830 P.2d
310, 311 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (upholding
aggravated robbery conviction where
defendant verbally threatened to use a gun
while putting his hand on his bulging
pocket).
**9 Ireland argues that the pointing gesture
inside his coat pocket does not constitute a
"representation" because it was not verbal.
We disagree and hold that the statute does
not require a "representation" to be *1030
verbal, but rather includes nonverbal
gestures.
**10 In Candelario, we interpreted the
term "representation" in a similar section of
the Utah Code to include nonverbal actions.
909 P.2d at 278. Specifically, Utah Code
section 76-3-203(2) (the enhancement
statute) provides that a sentence may be
enhanced by one year when " 'a dangerous
weapon or a facsimile or the representation
of a dangerous weapon, as provided in
Section 76-1-601' " is used while
committing a second degree felony.
Candelario, 909 P.2d at 278 (emphasis
added) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203(2) (1995) (amended to what is now
Utah Code Ann. $ 76-3-203.8 (2004))). We
defined "representation" as "an expansive
term," meaning "a statement conveying an
impression for the purpose of influencing
action." M Moreover, we noted that "[s]uch
a statement can be either in the form of a
verbal assertion or nonverbal action." Id. at
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278 n. 2 (citing Utah R. Evid. 801(a)).
Therefore, we conclude that "representation
of a dangerous weapon" as provided by
section 76-l-601(5)(b) can be in the form of
a nonverbal gesture.JTN1]
FN1. Our conclusion is consistent
with other jurisdictions interpreting
statutory language similar to Utah's.
These jurisdictions have found that
nonverbal
communications
are
sufficient to establish aggravated or
armed robbery charges when the
victim reasonably believes the
defendant has a dangerous weapon.
See State v. Ellison, 169 Ariz. 424,
819 P.2d 1010, 1011, 1012
(Ariz.Ct.App.1991)
(upholding
defendants' conviction of armed
robbery under Arizona armed
robbery statute where defendants
committed
robberies
by
"simulating] that they had handguns
in their pockets at the time they were
demanding money"); DeLeon v.
State, No. CACR 89-118, 1989 WL
148106, at * 1 , 1989 Ark. App.
LEXIS 608, at *3 (Ark.Ct.App. Dec.
6, 1989) (upholding armed robbery
conviction under Arkansas statute
providing that defendant must
M
represent[ ] by word or conduct"
that he is armed with a deadly
weapon where defendant asked for
money while he had his hand in his
pocket and the victim believed
defendant had a weapon or gun in his
pocket); State v. Arena, 235 Conn.
67, 663 A.2d 972, 973, 978 (1995)
(determining defendant's action of
placing an opaque bag on the counter
with an object inside pointing at the
clerk while stating "[p]ut all the
money
in a bag"
satisfied
Connecticut's armed robbery statute
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because defendant "represented by
his words or conduct" that he had a
firearm); State v. Lawrence, No.
9706017912, 2001 WL 1021385. at
*2. 2001 Del.Super. LEXIS 318. at
*7 (Del.Super.Ct Aug. 28. 2001)
(upholding conviction of robbery in
the first degree under Delaware
statute providing that defendant must
"display[ ] what appears to be a
deadly weapon" where defendant
wrapped a cloth around his hand so
that it appeared to hide a gun, and
where the victim reasonably believed
that defendant was armed (quotations
and citations omitted)), affd, 790
A.2d 476 (Del.2002); People v.
Taylor, 245 Mich.App. 293. 628
N.W.2d 55. 57. 61 (2001) (stating
"we decline to hold that a defendant
must verbally threaten the victim
with some specific bodily harm in
order to obtain a conviction of armed
robbery" where armed robbery
statute requires robber to be "armed
with a dangerous weapon, or any
article used or fashioned in a manner
to lead the person so assaulted to
reasonably believe it to be a
dangerous weapon");
People v.
Lopez, 135 A.D.2d 443. 522
N.Y.S.2d 145. 146 (1987) (holding
that where an unarmed robber holds
his hand in his pocket so as to give
the impression that he is holding a
gun, he has " '[displayed] what
appears to be a firearm' within the
meaning of the [armed robbery]
statute" and "there is no requirement
that the object need be anything
other than the defendant's hand"
(first alteration in original) (quoting
People v. Knowles, 79 A.D.2d 116.
123. 436 N.Y.S.2d 25 (N.Y.1981))).
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**11 Turning to the facts of this case, we
determine that Ireland's gesture of pointing
his hand inside his coat pocket close to his
right side with his elbow extended
constitutes a representation of a dangerous
weapon because such gesture was intended
to look like a gun for the purpose of
influencing Reinkoester to give Ireland all of
the cash in the cash drawer. [FN2]
FN2. Ireland relies heavily upon
State v. Sunivilh 741 P.2d 961
(Utah 1987). where the Utah
Supreme Court held, under a
previous version of the aggravated
robbery statute, that the defendant
did not commit aggravated robbery
where he had his hand in his pocket
held up over the counter as if he had
a gun, and made threats that he
would "blast" people if they did not
cooperate. Id. at 962. The prior
version of the aggravated robbery
statute narrowly defined aggravated
robbery as where the perpetrator
used "a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a
knife or a deadly weapon."
Id;
Utah Code Ann. § 76- 6-302 (1978).
The court held that the "[defendant's
menacing gesture accompanied by
verbal threats is not sufficient
evidence alone to establish the use of
a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm.
To hold otherwise would pervert the
language of section 76-6-302 and
erode the statutory distinction
between robbery and aggravated
robbery." Id. at 965. However, since
the Suniville decision, the Utah
Legislature amended the aggravated
robbery statute to include not only a
"facsimile"
but
also
a
"representation" of "any item capable
of causing death or serious bodily
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injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1601(5)(a),(b)(2004).

Ireland's conviction for aggravated robbery.
Accordingly, we affirm.

*1031 **12 Moreover, we determine that
Reinkoester reasonably believed that the
"item [was] intended to cause death or
serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. §
76-l-601(5)(b)(i) (2004).
Reinkoester
testified that he feared that if he did not
comply with Ireland's request, he may be
shot. Guns by their very nature are capable
of causing death or serious bodily injury.
Reinkoester's belief was based not only on
the subjective belief that he thought Ireland
had a gun, but also on objective evidence.
Reinkoester saw something "pointing at
[him]" inside Ireland's coat pocket. That
something "looked like a gun." This is
sufficient objective evidence to support a
reasonable belief that one might have been
injured if he or she did not comply. See,
e.g., Parker v. State, 271 Ark. 84, 607
S.W.2d 378, 379 (1980) (holding that
victim's subjective apprehension coupled
with defendant's objective conduct was
sufficient to sustain a conviction of
aggravated robbery); Faulkner v. State, 260
Ga.App. 794, 581 S.E.2d 365, 367 (2003)
(determining that victim had "reasonable
apprehension" where defendant used his
hand covered with a sock to look like a gun
and pressed it against victim's back); People
v. Taylor, 245 Mich.App. 293, 628 N.W.2d
55, 61 (2001) (holding there was ample
objective evidence that defendant either had
a gun or simulated one so as to deliberately
lead complainant to "reasonably believe" he
had a gun where defendant "placed his hand
inside his jacket and into the front of his
pants").

**14 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS
and NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judges.
113 P.3d 1028, 525 Utah Adv. Rep. 28,
2005 UT App 209
END OF DOCUMENT

CONCLUSION
**13 We hold that the trial court correctly
interpreted the aggravated robbery and
dangerous weapon statutes and uphold
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For
Official Publication)
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
[f 1] *1 The State appeals an interlocutory
order granting Defendant Ryan Wayne
Johnson's motion to reduce the charges from
aggravated robbery to robbery on six counts.
The State argues that the trial court erred in
interpreting the term "representation" of a
dangerous weapon in Utah Code sections
76-6-302 and 76-1-601 to include only
verbal statements. Utah Code Ann. $ § 766- 302, 76-1-601 (2004V The State avers

Page 1

that Johnson's use of his hand in his pocket
to simulate a gun constitutes a nonverbal
"representation" within the meaning of the
Utah Code. Johnson argues that even if we
determine nonverbal statements or gestures
constitute a "representation" under the
statute, the victims did not have a reasonable
belief that "the item [was] likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury" as required
by Utah Code section 76-1-601. [FNUId §
76-l-60U5Xb)(T). We reverse on five counts
and affirm on one count of the robbery
charges.
FN1. We review the trial court's
interpretation
of
statutes
for
correctness. See State v. Pixton, 2004
UT App 275^ 4,98P.3d433.
[<| 2] Johnson was charged with a total of six
counts of aggravated robbery in two separate
criminal informations. Four counts allegedly
occurred in December 2003 and two counts
in January 2004. Victims testified that on
each occasion Johnson approached the
victim and asked for money, that Johnson
had a bulge in his right pocket, that he had
his hand in his pocket, and that something
was protruding which looked like a gun. The
testimony was that Johnson made no verbal
threats nor did he tell any of the victims that
he had a gun in his possession. In addition,
some of the victims testified that they
complied with Johnson's requests because
they feared for their lives.
fl[ 3] In State v. Ireland, 2005 UT App 209.
also issued today, we held that a
"representation" constitutes both verbal and
nonverbal statements or gestures. See id. at \
10. Because the facts of this case are nearly
identical to those of Ireland, the same

© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Not Reported in P.3d
Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 1119638 (Utah App.), 2005 UT App 210
(Cite as: 2005 WL 1119638 (Utah App.))
reasoning applies. Consequently, we hold
that the trial court erred in interpreting Utah
Code sections 76-6-302 and 76-1- 601 and
that a "representation" may be made by both
verbal and nonverbal statements or gestures.
For each of the six counts of robbery,
Johnson's action of holding his hand in his
pocket simulating a gun constitutes a
"representation" within the meaning of Utah
Code section 76-1-601. Johnson's conduct is
sufficient to sustain aggravated robbery
charges so long as the victims "reasonably
belie [ved] the item [was] likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-60U5)(b)(i\
[f 4] After reviewing the record on each of
the six counts, we determine that the victims
had the requisite "reasonable belief to
sustain an aggravated robbery charge in all
but one of the six counts. In Ireland, we
determined that there must be objective
conduct by the defendant coupled with the
victim's
subjective
apprehension
to
constitute a reasonable belief. See 2005 UT
App 209 at 11 12. In five of the counts,
victims testified that they saw or assumed
that Johnson had a gun, and for that reason
they complied with Johnson's request to give
him money. However, the victim in Count I,
occurring in January 2004, "didn't think
[that Johnson had a gun] because the bulge
wasn't big enough." Moreover, the victim
stated she thought that Johnson "was very
nice-spoken[,] ... not aggressive, not
anything that would make you think that he
was going to cause you harm." Clearly, this
victim did not have the requisite reasonable
belief that Johnson would cause "death or
serious bodily injury," and the objective
facts of the encounter reinforce this
reasonable belief. Thus, there cannot be an
aggravated robbery charge for this count.

Page 2

four counts occurring in December 2003 and
Count II in January 2004 and hold that those
counts sustain an aggravated robbery charge
under Utah Code sections 76-6-302 and 761-601. See Utah Code Ann. § § 76-6-302.
76-1-601. We affirm Count I in January
2004 as a robbery charge because the victim
did not have the requisite reasonable
objective belief to sustain an aggravated
robbery charge.
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS and
NORMAN H. JACKSON. Judges.
Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 1119638
(Utah App.), 2005 UT App 210
END OF DOCUMENT

fl[ 5] *2 Accordingly, we reverse on the
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Addendum C

UT ST § 7 6 - 1 - 6 0 1
U.C.A. 1953 § 7 6 - 1 - 6 0 1
C
UTAH CODE. 1953
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
PART 6. DEFINITIONS
76-1-601 Definitions,

Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech.
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal
action.
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical
condition.
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission.
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means:
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to
reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is
in control of such an item.
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state.

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is
capable of acting.
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government,
partnership, or unincorporated association.
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or control
over tangible property.
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death.
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily
injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or
temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic
storage or transmission, or any other method of recording information or fixing
information in a form capable of being preserved.

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

UT ST § 76-6-302
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-302

P>

UTAH CODE. 1953
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 6. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY
PART 3. ROBBERY
76-6-302 Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing
a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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1

Salt Lake City, Utah; Wednesday, March 17, 2004; a.m.

2

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

THE COURT:

4

Good morning.

State of Utah versus

William Joseph Ireland, case ending 8349.

5

Counsel, will you make your appearances for the

6

record.

7

MR. PETERSON:

8

Mike Peterson representing

M r . Ireland, who is present.

9

MR. BOWN:

Greg Bown appearing for the State.

10

THE COURT:

And Mr. Ireland is with us?

11

MR. PETERSON:

He is.

Your Honor, during the course of this hearing I f m

12
13

wondering if I could ask the Court to allow the unshackling of

14

his writing hand so he can assist m e .

15

THE COURT:

16

How many witnesses will you have?

17

MR. BOWN:

18

shown up.

19

only witness.

20
21
22
23

We'll leave him shackled.

I have two, your Honor, but one has not

But I do have Andrew Reinkoester, who is here, m y

THE COURT:

Do you want to have him come up and be

THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear to tell the truth,

sworn.

the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

24 I

THE WITNESS:

25 |

THE COURT:

Yes.
Before you begin, Mr. Peterson, my

1

understanding is this matter was set for jury trial, the trial

2

has been cancelled and the sole issue today is whether or not

3

Mr. Ireland is guilty of a first-degree felony or a

4

second-degree felony.

5

MR. BOWN:

Yes, your Honor.

The exact issue is the

6

use of a dangerous weapon during the course of committing a

7

robbery.

8

THE COURT:

9

Can you establish this and go forward

with just one witness?

10

MR. BOWN:

11

THE COURT: All right.

12

I believe so, your Honor.

ANDREW

You may proceed.

REIDflKDESTER

13

called as a witness in behalf of the State, having

14

first been duly sworn, was examined and testified as

15

follows:

16

DIRECT EXMflHanON

17

BY MR, BCWN:

18

Q

Will you state your name, please.

19 I

A

Andrew Jeffrey Reinkoester.

20

Q

Please spell your last name.

21

A

R-E-I-N-K-O-E-S-T-E-R.

22

Q

Calling your attention to December 6th of 2 003, were

23

you working on that day?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Where did you work?

1

A

At Fortier Jewelers.

2

Q

Where is that located?

3

A

That is at the northern end of Gateway Mall complex.

4

Q

11 South Rio Grand?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Was that in Salt Lake County?

7

A

Yes.

8 I

Q

And what do you do there?

9

A

I am a sales associate for the store.

10

Q

On December 16th, in the afternoon, did anything

11

unusual happen?

12

MR. PETERSON:

13

MR. BOWN:

14

MR. PETERSON:

15

Q

Excuse me.

It's December 6th.

Excuse me. What did I say?
The 16th.

(BY MR. BOWN)

December the 6th.

16

A

Yes. We were robbed.

17

Q

About what time did this occur?

18

A

Between four and five o1clock.

19 J

Q

Describe what you saw the person -- did the person

20

rob you?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

This person who robbed you, where was this person

23
24
25

when you very first saw this person?
A

Outside the store, coming towards the store.
MR. BOWN:

Okay.

I think it might be helpful, your

1

Honor, as we develop testimony, that he do a diagram of the

2

interior of the store so we can have some idea of what he's

3

doing.

4
5

THE COURT:

You may.

If you want to pull that board

out, you can write on it, the drawing board.

6

Q

(BY MR. BOWN)

Now, what I would like you to

7

do, Mr. Reinkoester, is do a diagram of the interior of Fortier

8

Jewelry, and if you can keep it up high, that allows everybody

9

to see where it was. And it's a blue marker to begin with, and

10

just do the interior, not where everybody was, just the

11

interior.

12

A

Okay.

13

Q

Could you draw the exterior walls as well?

14

A

Sure.

15

Q

Okay.

16
17

Now, why don't you step just to this side, if

you would, and describe what it is that you have drawn.
A

Okay.

This is the entrance to the store, and these

18

represent jewelry cases right here, here, and here. And this

19

is the front desk.

20

Q

Okay.

Now, for the record, the first indication that

21

you had that you made was the --at the top of the diagram

22

there is a broken - - a line that is --

23

A

Broken.

24

Q

-- broken.

25

A

Yes.

1

Q

That is the door?

2

A

That is the door.

3

Q

Does it swing inside or outside?

4

A

It does both.

5

Q

Looks like elbows, elbow-shaped boxes, three of them.

6

Those are what?

7

A

Those are the jewelry cases.

8

Q

And there are spaces between those, right?

9

A

Right.

10

Q

What's there?

11

A

Like here?

12

store.

13

Q

Then there's a rectangular box.

14

A

That is the front desk.

15

Q

Okay.

16

That's just a walkway to the center of

Where is the money for that store kept in

Fortier Jewelry?

17

A

In the front desk.

18

Q

Is it in the drawer?

19

A

Yeah.

20

Q

Please indicate that.

21

A

Sure.

22

Q

Where that would be.

23

A

Drawer right here.

24

Q

Okay.

25

What is that?

Now, where were you -- let me give you a red

pen, if I could, to decide where people are.

1
2

In red and with a red pen indicate where you were
when you first saw the person who came in?

3

A

I am right here.

4

Q

Put an

5

!

X', red 'X' there.

From the front the part

of the store, I guess it would be on the north end?

6

A

Right.

7

Q

And where was the person who robbed you when you

8

first saw him?

9

A

First saw him?

10

Q

Yes.

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

Okay.

13

A

He came into the store.

Just outside the door, is that correct?

What happened after you first saw this person?
I greeted him.

I said

14

hello. And he said I want you to go and get me all the money

15

in the cash drawer right now.

16
17

Q

Where was this person when he said that?

Put a

number one there, if you would.

18

A

Sure.

19

Q

Do you recognize the person, that said those things

20

Right here.

to you, in the courtroom today?

21

A

Yes, I do.

22

Q

Would you point to that person and describe what that

23
24
25

person is wearing today.
A

It is the defendant in the yellow jumpsuit.
MR. BOWN:

Let the record reflect the identification

1

of the defendant.

2

THE COURT:

3

Q

The record will so reflect.

(BY MR. BOWN)

Tell me -- we'll get into some

4

other details later, but showing movement, after that was

5

stated to you, what did you do?

6
7

A

request and came to the cash drawer.

8
9

After that was stated, I circled around at his

Q

So in the counter-clockwise way you went around the

outside of the store?

10

A

Yes, around the periphery.

11

Q

Okay.

12

doing that?

13

A

He circled right here.

14

Q

Why don't you close that up and take the witness

15

seat.

16
17
18
19

Where did the defendant go while you were

When you first saw -- when you saw the defendant
inside the store, how was the defendant dressed?
A

The defendant was wearing a very large coat, thick

coat --it was brown -- and a beanie cap.

20

Q

Do you know what kind of pants he had on?

21

A

No.

22

Q

Was he doing anything -- let me ask you this.

23

Did

you see his hands?

24

A

I only recall -- I did not see his hands, no.

25

Q

Okay.

And that's a bare hand that I'm talking about,

1

A

Right.

2

Q

Did you see where his hands were?

3

A

Yes.

4

There was one hand in a pocket, gesturing like

there was a gun.

5

Q

This coat is what kind of a coat?

6

A

It's -- if I recall correctly it was a very thick

7

--

thick brown coat.

8

Q

Wool?

9

A

Maybe down, if I remember correctly.

10

Q

Kind of puffy?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

Would you stand, please, and indicate how you saw the

13

Parka?

Do you recall?

defendant ! s hand in his pocket?

14

A

Like my own pockets?

15

Q

No, just best you can.

16

A

About like this.

17

Q

You have it against your body?

18

A

Urn-hum.

19

Q

Towards -- if I were you --

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

--it would be pointing at me?

22

A

Yeah.

23

Q

What did he say -- let me ask you this.

24
25

Was that the

first thing you saw or heard?
A

Yeah.

The first thing I said was hello, and the

1

first thing I heard, the response was give me all the cash in

2

the cash drawer.

3
4

Q

When, in relationship to that, get me all the cash in

the cash drawer, was the hand in like this?

5

A

The whole time.

6

Q

So he started out that way?

7

A

Started out that way.

8

Q

Did you move at all?

9

A

No.

10

Q

Move back and forth?

11 I

A

No.

12

Q

Now, you had your hand kind of tucked in?

13

A

Right.

14

Q

Your arm kind of tucked back a little bit; is that

I said okay, and I went over there.

15 J correct?
16

A

Yes.

17

Q

So it was not pointing out far?

18

A

No, no.

It was definitely gesturing like there was a

19

weapon, but it was more subtle. Didn't say -- something like

20

this, because there was a lot of other people in the store.

21

Q

Let me ask you this.

Who else was in the store?

22

A

Myself, Cherie.

23

Q

Besides yourself.

24

A

Cherie, Nelson, Dominique, Warren, and two customers.

25

Q

Nelson, who's that?

1

A

He's the owner of the store.

2

Q

And after he said get me the money in the cash

3
4

drawer, what did you do?
A

I said all right.

I circled around and came behind

5

the cash drawer and we met over there and I proceeded on

6

getting the cash.

7

Q

Why did you do that?

8

A

Because I thought he had a weapon.

9

Q

Did he ever say he had a weapon?

10

A

No.

11

Q

What was it that led you to believe he had a weapon?

12

A

The motioning in the coat pocket.

13

Q

When you got over to the desk, what happened there?

14

A

I proceeded to start getting the cash out.

I

15

thought -- we didn't have a lot of cash.

I fumbled around with

16

bags for a little while.

17

grabbed a darker bag and put that in. And he said, "Is that

18

all you've got?"

19

like a roll of quarters and said, "Do you want the change?"

20

And he said, "Fill it with jewelry."

I started with clear bags and then

And I was like, "Yes."

21

Q

22

desk is he?

23

A

He's right up against the desk.

24

Q

Like I am to this podium?

25

A

Yes.

And then I held out

While he's standing there, how far in front of the

1

Q

How high is the desk where he is standing?

2

A

It's probably about somewhere in here.

3

Q

You're indicating mid chest?

4

A

Yeah.

5

Q

Your mid chest?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

Where did it hit?

8

defendant?

9

A

10

Standing about like this.

Where did the top hit the

Probably a little bit higher.

I don't recall

exactly.

11

Q

At that point did you see the hand that he had in the

13

A

No.

14

Q

Why is that?

15

A

Just the desk was too high.

16

Q

What happened after you gave him the bag with the

17

money?

12

coat?

18
19

Let me ask you this.
We got to the point where he said put some jewelry

in --

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

What happened at that point?

22

A

At that time Nelson noticed something was wrong over

23

at the front desk and exited the store.

24

think he noticed --

25

MR. PETERSON:

I object.

And at that point I

Speculation as to what

1

Nelson noticed.

2

THE COURT:

3

Q

4 J
5
6
7

A

Sustained,

(BY MR. BOWN)

Tell me what you saw Nelson do.

I saw Nelson exit the store.

And he said, "Just give

it to me," and I gave it to him and he ran to the front door.
Q

At any of that time -- was the defendant looking at

you all the time?

Or did he look anywhere else?

8

A

I can't recall.

9

Q

What happened after you gave him the bag?

10

A

He went to the front door and Nelson was on the other

11

side, kind of blocking him.

12

fucking door."

13

ran out and Nelson chased him.

14
15

Q

And he said, "Don't block the

And he pushed, and Nelson finally gave and he

Do you recall whether at that time he took his hand

out of the pocket?

16

A

I do not.

17

Q

Do you ever recall what was going on with his left

18
19
20

hand during the entire time?
A

Other than taking the bag with the money -- I can't

remember.

21

Q

So he took the bag of money with his left hand?

22

A

I can't remember.

23

Q

Did you ever see his right hand outside of the coat?

24

A

I can't remember.

25

Q

Okay.

What happened after the defendant made it out

1

the door?

2

What did you see?

A

I saw him take off running and I saw Nelson chasing

4

Q

Did you go out yourself and —

5

A

I did not.

6

Q

Did you know whether or not the defendant had a gun?

7

A

Concretely no, but I assumed so.

8

Q

Based on what?

9

A

Based on the gesturing in the pocket.

3

him.

10

MR. BOWN:

11

Just a moment, your Honor.

I have no further questions.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. PETERSON:

14
15
16
17

Thank you, Judge.

ci^ss-Exajyii^Ti^
BY MR. EETERSCN:
Q

Andrew, when you were located where you indicated on

the diagram with the red ! X ! --

18

A

Sure.

19

Q

— I

20

Mr. Peterson.

take it you could see from this position through

a glass door to the outside?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

And how long did you observe my client outside the

A

Probably about two seconds, walking, starting toward

23
24
25

door?

the glass door.

1
2

Q

Okay.

What did you observe physically about my

client as he walked toward the door?

3

A

Like in description of what he looked like?

4

Q

Um-hum.

5

A

Okay.

I noticed that he had on the thick puffy coat

6

and he had on a beanie.

I noticed that he was very bristly,

7

didn't shave in a day or two, and that he was coming very

8

determined into the store.

9

Q

When you say "very determined," was he walking?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

So your sense is there was a man walking toward the

12

store, he's coming in the store?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

Naturally, to get in the store he has to open the

15

door manually; correct?

16

A

Correct.

17

Q

Are you watching him as he comes in the door?

18

A

Yes, I am.

19

Q

Okay.

20

So does Mr. Ireland reach out and open the

door with his hand?

21

A

I do not remember.

22

Q

What do you remember about him opening the door?

23

A

Not much.

24
25

I don't remember even if he opened it

towards me or towards himself.
Q

Okay.

All right.

As he's walking toward the store

1

from the outside do you recall whether his hands are to the

2

side swinging freely?

3

A

No, I don't recall.

4

Q

Do you recall anything about his hands as he's

5

walking towards the store?

6

A

I do not.

7

Q

Do you recall whether you see Mr. Ireland carrying

8

anything as he comes toward the store?

9

A

0h7 like a bag?

10

Q

Or anything.

11

A

I didn't see him carrying anything.

12

Q

At any time, from the time Mr. Ireland comes into the

13

Fortier store until he exits and runs away, did you see him

14

carrying anything other than the bag you handed him?

15

A

No.

16

Q

When Mr. Ireland approached you, I take it that he

17

walked directly to where you indicated with a number one?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

And at that point you say how's it going?

20

A

Basically, yeah. Hello.

21

Q

And his response is hi, how are you?

22
23
24
25

Or what's his

response?
A

His response is I want you to go over to the cash

drawer and get me the money.
Q

So there are no pleasantries.

He just goes right to

1

the money?

2

A

Correct•

3

Q

Okay.

4

A

Right.

5

Q

And December down at the Gateway is wintertime?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

It's cold outside?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

People wear coats?

10

A

Urn-hum.

11

Q

Not infrequently people will maybe have hands inside

12

We're in December when this happens, right?

a coat when they come in?

13

A

Sure.

14

Q

The exterior that we're talking about here, from the

15

outside of the store to the inside, is all outdoors; right?

16

A

Right.

17

Q

So you have had customers come into Fortier Jewelry

18

before in the wintertime with their hands inside a coat,

19

correct?

20

A

Sure.

21

Q

Now, let's break down for Judge Maughn everything

22

that my client says.

23

A

Okay.

24

Q

So when he's at position number one, that's when he

25

demands money.

2
3

A

Yes.

Q

Does he say anything else while you are standing at

point 'X1 and he's at point one?

4

A

He says, "I'm not kidding.

Hurry."

5

Q

How do you respond?

6

A

Mostly with a gesture.

7

Q

Okay.

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Acknowledging that he demanded money?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Does he say anything else while he's standing at

Like that.

So you kind of shrug your shoulders?

12

point one?

13

A

No.

14

Q

Is it after he said that that you begin to walk

15

around the perimeter to the desk?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

By the way, what prevents you from walking out the

18

front door?

19

A

Walking out the front door?

20

Q

Yes.

21

A

No.

22

Q

Do you say anything to anybody as you walk from the

23
24
25

jewelry case at point 'X' around the other case to the desk?
A

I had to pass behind Dominique and I think I said,

"Excuse me, Dominique."

1

Q

Okay.

2

A

No.

3

Q

As you're walking toward the desk?

4

A

No.

5

Q

What movement does Mr. Ireland do then when you walk

6
7
8

Did you say anything else to anyone else?

around the case to the desk?
A

He just kind of comes and tracks me and comes to the

desk.

9

Q

So he walks across the display room floor?

10

A

Um-hum.

11

Q

Essentially in a straight line?

12

A

Not exactly.

13

Q

Okay.

14
15
16
17
18

More like kind of a half moon.

Keeping a certain distance.

As he's walking

in this half moon, what did you observe about my client.
A

Not much.

at that point.
Q

I was not actually looking at the client

I was looking strictly at the cash drawer.

While you're walking toward the desk do you hear my

client say anything?

19

A

No.

20

Q

Do you hear him talk to anybody else, while he's in

21

the store, besides you?

22

A

No.

23

Q

You get to the desk where the cash is, and where is

24
25

my client at that time?
A

At the front of the desk.

1
2

Q

Okay.

And at that point you don't know whether he

has his hands outside his pockets or not, right?

3

A

Correct.

4

Q

He's not holding his hand in the pocket and gesturing

5

the pocket up toward you any longer, correct?

6

A

Correct.

7

Q

What, if anything, does Mr. Ireland say while he's at

8

the desk where you're getting the cash?

9

A

Okay.

Get the money together and give it to him.

10

And he says, "Is this all?"

11

And he's like, "Fill it with jewelry."

12

Q

And I said, "Want the change?"
That's it.

At any time while you're getting the cash, putting it

13

in the bag, does Mr. Ireland make any physical gestures toward

14

you?

15

A

No.

16

Q

Is there anything else that Mr. Ireland says while

17

he's at that desk?

18

A

After Nelson left the store, "Just give it to me."

19

Q

"Just give it to me," referring to --

20

A

To the bag.

21

Q

To the bag.

All right. Now, you've indicated, in

22

answering some questions from Mr. Bown, that you felt like

23

there might be something in Mr. Ireland's coat pocket other

24

than a hand; right?

25

A

Yes, um-hum.

1

Q

The sole reason you say that is because he lifted his

2

hand inside the pocket when he first encountered you where

3

you!re marked at point

f

X! ?

4

A

Um-hum.

5

Q

Yes?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

Mr. Ireland never says anything to you about

8

possessing a weapon, correct?

9

A

Correct.

10

Q

Mr. Ireland never says anything to you about harming

11

you with a weapon, correct?

12

A

Correct.

13

Q

And Mr. Ireland never makes any statements alluding

14

to the possibility of shooting?

15

A

Correct.

16

Q

Or of cutting you?

17

A

Correct.

18

Q

You said to Mr. Bown your apprehension was maybe he

19

had a gun, right?

20

A

Yes, um-hum.

21

Q

Obviously, that's speculation on your part; right?

22

A

Sure, yes.

23

Q

Why do you speculate that he had a gun as opposed to

24
25

perhaps a knife?
A

There is no reason other than thatfs just what my

1
2

3
4

itiind jumped to when I saw the bulge in the pocket, pointed at
I rue.

Q

And you never said anything to Mr. Ireland about

what's in the pocket?

5

A

No.

6

Q

So the bottom line, Andrew, is you don't have any

7
8

idea whether he had a weapon in his pocket or not; do you?
A

9
10

Concretely, no.
MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, could I ask that an item

be marked, please, as Defense No. 1?

11

(Defendant's Exhibit No. 1

12

was introduced.)

13

MR. PETERSON:

14

Your Honor, may I approach the

witness?

15

THE COURT:

16

Q

You may.

(BY MR. PETERSON)

And I'm showing you a

17

document, which is two-sided, now marked as Defendant's Exhibit

18

No. 1.

19

A

Yes, I do.

20

Q

What is that?

21

A

That's the statement I filled out on the night of the

22

Do you recognize that?

robbery.

23

Q

And did the detective ask you to fill that out?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

You filled this out, obviously, close in time to when

1

this robbery occurred; correct?

2

A

Correct.

3

Q

So that was fresh in your mind at that point, is that

4

correct?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Let me ask you to read through blocks one, two, and

7

three on the first page there.

8

A

Okay.

Out loud?

9

Q

No.

10

A

All right. Okay.

11

Q

Andrew, do you see anywhere in blocks one, two, or

Just to yourself.

12

three where you filled out in your police statement any

13

indication that my client had his hand in his pocket?

14

A

No.

15

Q

Do you see anywhere in that statement to the police

16

where you stated anything about feeling that my client had a

17

weapon?

18

A

19
20
21
22

No.
MR. PETERSON:

Honor.
THE COURT:

Yes, you may.

(Mr. Peterson and the defendant confer.)

23

MR. PETERSON:

24

statement for Mr. Bown?

25

If I may have just one moment, your

Your Honor, may I retrieve the

THE COURT: Yes.

1

MR. PETERSON:

After Mr. Bown is through questioning

2

here, your Honor, I'll move admission of Defendant's Exhibit

3

No. 1, for the court's perusal.

4

THE COURT: Any objection?

5

MR. BOWN:

6

THE COURT:

7

(Defendant's Exhibit No. 1

8

was received into evidence.)

9

MR. BOWN:

10

I don't, your Honor.
It will be received.

If I may approach the witness.
REDIRECT EXaMPSIATIQISr

11

BY MR. BOWN:

12

Q

13

Exhibit 1.

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

Did you, in there, write anything?

16

A

Yes, I did.

17

Q

Okay.

18

description?

19

A

In block seven?

20

Q

Block seven.

21

A

Block seven, additional description, weapon in pocket

22

Let me show you the reverse side of Defendant's
There's some what?

Illustrations of weapons?

What did you say in addition to the

if there was one.

23

Q

So you did describe you thought there was a weapon.

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Now, Mr. Peterson said that you speculated there was

1

a gun.

Now, speculation is when there is no basis for it. Did

2

you have a basis for believing that there was a gun?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

What was that?

5

A

Bulge in his pocket, the way it looked, pointed at

7

Q

Gesturing?

8

A

Yeah.

9

Q

As you were first approached and you were walking

6

10
11

me.

around to the desk, why didn!t you walk out the front door?
A

It did not occur to me. What was going on in my mind

12

was there! s a guy who wants money and he may have a weapon.

13

I just was compliant.

14

Q

So

Why didn't you say anything about a robbery to

15

Dominique?

16

A

Fear.

17

Q

Fear of what?

18

A

Fear of reprisal^ from the suspect.

19

Q

In what way?

20

A

Maybe being shot.

21

Q

When the defendant was in front of the desk where the

22
23
24
25

money was, was he gesturing with his hand in his coat pocket?
A

At the desk I could not see his -- that part of his

coat anymore.
Q

So you donft know if he was or was not?

2
3

A

I don•t know.

Q

Is there any question in your mind that the defendant

apparently intended to make you believe he had a gun?

4

A

5
6

No, there is no question.
THE COURT: Would you repeat.

I'm not sure I got the

last part.

7

MR. BOWN:

Is there any question in your mind that

8

the defendant apparently intended to make you believe he had a

9

gun?

10
11

MR. PETERSON:

Well, I object.

That calls for wild

speculation.

12

THE COURT:

He already answered that.

13

asking for clarification.

14

whatever he wants.

15

MR. PETERSON:

I was just

If he believed, he can believe

Mr. Bown's asking did you believe

16

Mr. Ireland believed something.

17

THE COURT:

18

Q

No, that's not true.

(BY MR. BOWN)

It's -- is there any question in

19

your mind that the defendant apparently intended to make you

20

believe he had a gun?

21
22
23

A

No.
MR. PETERSON:

That calls for the witness to define

what my client intended.

24

MR. BOWN:

No.

There is an apparent intention, which

25

is what the statute requires.

1
2

Ifm going to overrule the objection, but

THE COURT:

you're certainly free to cross-examine him.

3

MR. BOWN:

I have no further questions.

4
5
6

RECROSS EXAMINATiatsr
BY MR. EETERSCN:
Q

Andrew, on the flip side of your witness report,

7

which is marked as Defendant's Exhibit 1, which has now been

8

admitted, when you comment about weapon in pocket, you say, "if

9

there was one"; right?

10

A

Right.

11

Q

So to that extent there's speculation or guesswork at

12
13

play about whether there was a weapon or not?
A

Right.

14

MR. PETERSON:

That's all I have.

15

MR. BOWN:

16

THE COURT: Mr. Reinkoester, thank you for being

No further questions.

17

here. Would you hand me the exhibit, please, and then you're

18

free to leave.

19

Anything further?

20

MR. BOWN:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. BOWN:

23
24
25

That's all the witnesses I can find.
Do you want to look in the hall?
If I may.

He is not there, your Honor, so we have no further
evidence at this time.
THE COURT:

Mr. Peterson, do you intend to have any

1

evidence at all?

2

MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, we do not.

I have advised

3

Mr. Ireland, of course, he has the right to testify here and it

4

is my advice for him that you not submit to testimony here

5

today.

6

Do you intend to follow that?

7

THE DEFENDANT:

8

MR. PETERSON:

9

witnesses to offer.

Sure.
Your Honor, we don't have additional

Basically this is an

10

eyewitness-observation issue relative to the elements in the

11

statute, and so we're prepared to submit on the evidence and

12

then move to the argument portion of the motion.

13
14
15
16
17

THE COURT:

Mr. Peterson, it's your motion.

Do you

want to begin?
MR. PETERSON:

Yes.

Thank you very much, Judge.

Your Honor, you've had a chance to review, I hope, a
courtesy copy of our memorandum that I submitted last week?

18

THE COURT:

I have.

19

MR. PETERSON:

And in this memorandum I cite the

20

Court to basically four separate cases out of this jurisdiction

21

that deal roughly with this issue, beginning with the

22

requirement in Suniville that there be some kind of an actual

23

showing of a facsimile.

24

Supreme Court in that opinion was if we don't have something

25

realistic looking, then we really are eroding the distinction

Of course, the rationale of the

1

between a first and second-degree robbery.

2

that since Suniville was handed down the legislature has

3

amended the language with regard to the aggravated-robbery

4

statute in defining dangerous weapon to include

5

representations.

6 I

And I understand

The reason I cite the Court to the Adams opinion,

7

the Hartman opinion, and the other opinion inside of -- the

8

Candelario opinion is to suggest to the Court that appellate

9

courts have taken a close look at this representation language,

10

and although not explicitly readopting the Suniville standard

11

have said that there needs to be something fairly direct,

12

fairly poignant with regard to that representation in order for

13

there to be a distinction with regard to the use or represented

14

use of a weapon versus fear or force of fear, which is the

15

element in a second-degree robbery.

16

I would submit that the Adams, Hartman and

17

Candelario cases are all maintaining that the substantial step

18

has to at least be:

19

I'm going to shoot you. I'm going to cut you.

20

indicate to a victim that if there is a concealed hand, which

21

there was in at least one of these cases, that there be some

22

form of verbal representation that gives reasonable

23

apprehension to the victim that there is imminent danger from

24

the use of a weapon.

25

I have a weapon.

I'm going to blast you.
Something to

In the present case, Judge, our argument is we don't

1

have the imminency present here.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. PETERSON:

4

THE COURT:

I understand --

Let me ask you this question.
Sure.

What if you had the same testimohy that

5

was just elicited on the stand, and the defendant left -- was

6

apprehended as he subsequently was and he had a revolver in his

7

right-hand pocket.

8

second degree?

9

Would he be guilty of a first degree or a

MR. PETERSON:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. PETERSON:

12

No.

My position is no.
It has to be one or the other.
I'm sorry.

I thought your question

was would he be guilty of a first degree.

13

He would be guilty of a second degree, in my

14

opinion, because it's the apprehension at the time that the

15

robbery is occurring that's critical as opposed to the

16

after-developed discovery and fact that there was an actual

17

robbery.

18

THE COURT:

19

apprehension?

20

cut if I didn't.

Well, what about the witness's

His testimony was I was afraid I'd get shot or

21

MR. PETERSON:

22

afraid I would get shot, not cut.

23

THE COURT:

Actually, his testimony was I was

I agree he didn't say cut, but he thought

24

it was a weapon.

A gun versus a knife.

25

thought he would be injured.

But my point is he

1

MR. PETERSON:

Right. And I understand that he has

2

testified to that, Judge, but under cross-examination, as we

3

develop the testimony, he said, well, yeah, I -- that was

4

guesswork.

5

Which of course he's entitled to whatever apprehension he!s

6

entitled to.

7

That was speculation.

It was my speculation.

But what I'm suggesting is when we're drawing a

8

distinction between a first degree and second degree, under a

9

Suniville type of analysis, it's not just the subjective belief

10

of the victim that is critical.

11

and objective legal standard that enters into play.

12

we would simply erode the distinction between a first and a

13

second and leave it totally up to the subjective apprehension

14

of the victim.

15

There's a certain objectivity
Otherwise,

What I'm suggesting to the court is the Suniville

16

case and other cases that have followed since the legislative

17

amendment impose a certain objective element such that the

18

court in the, you know, calmer light of months after the fact

19

can analyze whether there was a realistic apprehension of a

20

weapon or not.

21

If you deem that there was, then there is legal

22

sufficiency for maintaining this prosecution as a first-degree

23

felony.

24

he was going to shoot or cut, that the lifting of the hand was

25

not sufficient, under this legislative language, to elevate the

I'm simply saying that without Mr. Ireland suggesting

1

matter from a second to a first degree.

2

THE COURT:

You assume Suniville is law?

3

MR. PETERSON:

Well, I think Suniville is informative

4

law.

I'm not going to say it's binding on this court because

5

the legislature amended the statute after the Suniville

6

decision and broadened the language.

7

at all.

8

rationale ought to be brought to bear as we analyze the

9

language and the other cases that have come down after the new

I'm not here to deny that

I'm simply suggesting that a lot of the Suniville

10

amendment when we talk about the dangers of eroding the first

11

and second-degree distinction here.

12

THE COURT:

Well, if you go to Adams for a minute.

13

MR. PETERSON:

14

THE COURT:

15

Adams never mentions Suniville.

Right.

That's a court of appeals decision.

16

MR. PETERSON:

17

THE COURT:

Um-hum.

But on facts that are very, very similar,

18

in my mind, the court of appeals upheld the conviction that

19

Suniville overruled.

20

Do you agree with that?

MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, I think that that is true.

21

I think that the Adams court absolutely relied on the new

22

language of the statute with regard to representation in

23

deciding to distinguish the facts of the Adams case from the

24

Suniville case.

25

about Adams for the court to analyze is the verbal component

But what I do also think that is critical

1

where the defendant in that case, in addition to having the

2

bulge in the pocket, said that he would shoot the Taco Bell

3

clerk he was robbing.

4

THE COURT: Anything further?

5

MR. PETERSON:

6

MR. BOWN:

No.

Thank you, Judge.

Just briefly, your Honor.

My memo

7

basically, is still, down to a few words is, to just read the

8

statute.

9

talks about what is a dangerous weapon, and that is referred to

10
11

The statute we're talking about is 76-1-601(5) which

in the aggravated robbery statute.
And there aren't very many people, I guess, who were

12

around when Suniville came down, but that was my case. I

13

remember it very vividly.

14

after that decision came down and the legislature did, in the

15

very next session, amend it to this very broad language in

16

76-1-601, saying that, "dangerous weapon" means any item

17

capable of causing death or serious bodily injury -- and I

18

think it's not disputed that a firearm would fit in that

19

category -- or a facsimile or representation of the item.

20

I recall there was a huge outcry

In Suniville it was a prior statute, and I have it

21

in my memo that it was, the statute was simply used a deadly

22

weapon or a facsimile -- that's all it says -- of that weapon.

23

Basically, the way we looked at the Suniville case

24

was that when you point a gun you've got to do a photocopy of a

25

gun and show it to them in order to have it under that

1

rationale.

2

So the end result is that the legislature broadened

3

the definition of dangerous weapon and in effect told the

4

supreme court we exactly mean that, that if it's a verbal

5

representation; if it's a non-verbal representation such as

6

gesturing with a hand in the coat or in a pocket, that's

7

enough.

8

there is not -- if you don't have the item capable of causing

9

death or serious bodily injury, a facsimile or representation

And if you look at the statute itself it says that if

10

of the item.

"Representation" means -- I looked in the

11

dictionary for what "representation" meant and several things

12

come out.

13

as the counterpart or image of; to take the place of in some

14

respect; state in a manner intended to effect action or

15

judgment; to serve as a specimen, example, or instance of; to

16

form an image or a representation of in the mind; to correspond

17

to in essence.

It means to serve as a sign or symbol of; to serve

18

All that means that it is in the statute.

19

someone represents, by verbal or non-verbal conduct, that they

20

have a weapon, that's enough.

21

If

And it says in (5)(b)(i) that the actor's use or

22

apparent intended use -- very broad, very low standard --of

23

the item, and that means is there something that would give

24

basis to someone to believe that the item is a firearm, in this

25

case.

And that apparent intended use leads the victim to

1

reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious

2

bodily injury.
And I submit that's exactly what we have in this

3
4

case, that the victim had -- did not speculate because

5

speculation based on facts is not speculation.

6

It is not speculation at all.

7

testified to, that he believed, I would submit, reasonably

8

believed based on what he saw, that the gesturing by the

9

defendant caused him to do things that he would not have done

10
11
12
13
14
15

otherwise.

It is —

It is a belief.

that's what the witness

It was all reasonable.
An apparent intended use is not -- intentionally, we

don't get into his intent.

Just his apparent intended use.

In (b)(ii) it says or the actor --or the actor
represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner.
There are a couple of things that were interesting

16

that I saw, and that is in Rule 801 of the Rules of Evidence it

17

defines a statement.

This is just before hearsay.

18

defines a statement:

Statement is an oral or written assertion

19

or nonverbal conduct of a person.

20

conduct or an oral or written assertion if that nonverbal

21

conduct is intended by the person as an assertion.

22

And it

So a statement is nonverbal

In the definition 76-1-601 an act means voluntary

23

bodily movement and it includes speech.

Act and statement seem

24

to be almost the same. And I would submit that what the

25

legislature intended was that if the defendant -- if a person

1

who robs somebody says he has a gun, that's enough.

2

indicates in any other matter that he has a gun, that's enough

3

to make it an aggravated robbery.

4

if the apparent intended use leaves the victim to reasonably

5

believe that he has one, has a gun, that's enough.

6

If he

And the subjective part is

Very broad statute, and I submit that under the

7

facts of this case, that contemporaneous with the demand for

8

money, we have a gesture which is reasonably interpreted by the

9

clerk that he may or may not have a gun, but he does things

10

because -- that he would not have done otherwise because of

11

that gesture.

12

legislature intends that the facts of this case be charged and

13

constitute the offense of aggravated robbery, first-degree

14

felony.
THE COURT:

15
16
17

And I submit, based on all that, that the

correct?

This statute was amended in 1989,

Or close to it?
MR. BOWN:

Close to it.

I know Suniville came out

18

and it was just right after that that the legislature amended

19

the statute.

20

THE COURT: Well, I have done a search in this area

21

and I don't pretend it to be exhaustive, but every subsequent

22

case indicates there has got to be something more than a bulge

23

in a pocket, that I can read.

24

definition, and if there has been a conviction upheld it's

25

because of some corroborating statement:

And every other case takes the

I have a gun.

I have

a knife.

Even Suniville, I think, wouldn't stand up today,

2
3

I'll use this.

with this new definition.
MR. BOWN:
THE COURT:

6

MR. BOWN:

7

I"11 blow you away.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. BOWN:

10

I think it would.
You think Suniville -Yes. He had the finger and he was saying

I mean the holding in Suniville.
Holding.

Excuse me.

Yes.

I thought you

meant the facts, and I believe you're right.
THE COURT:

11

So I have something here and -- but I'm

12

troubled by two things. One, I don't think that employees or

13

anybody else should have to second-guess what is going on in an

14

accused's mind when they put their hand in their pocket.

15

Obviously, something is intended.

16

this case, you walk in and say -- hands in view, whatever --

17

give me your money.

18

their weapon in their hand in a manner which to most of us

19

would indicate -- certainly would indicate to me that there was

20

a weapon involved the way the hand is being held, the way the

21

command is made to get money.

22

people, would be alarmed, and I think it's unfair to put the

23

burden upon a victim in that case and say, well, show me what!s

24

there, at the risk of being blown away or stabbed or hit or

25

hurt.

If nothing were intended in

But as soon as somebody starts to hold

I think all of us, or most

1

On the other hand, that may be a baseball, golf

2

ball, nothing.

3

found.

4

time.

That doesn't necessarily mean one w a s n ! t used at the

5
6

And in this case apparently no weapon was ever

But, Mr. Bown, what does "represent" mean?

The term

"representation"?

7

MR. BOWN:

That's the question I had, too, your

8

Honor.

9

something like a gun.

10

To represent is to make it known to other persons,

THE COURT:

Well, I think you've met the statute

11

where it says the actor's use or apparent intended use of the

12

item leads the victim to reasonably believe that the item is

13

likely to cause death or serious injury.

14

apply, that the actor didn't represent verbally -- well, maybe

15

he did when it says any other manner he's in control of an

16

item.

17

representation.

Number two doesn't

But those are predicate to the facsimile or
That's why I ask what "representation" means.

18

MR. BOWN:

Well, it's not an identical thing because

19

that's a facsimile.

But "representation" is something that is

20

a sign or a symbol of, or a form, or image, or representation

21

of something that in the mind of someone corresponds to an

22

incidence.

23

put it this way.

24

when it's in a gesturing mode, is in fact a representation,

25

nonverbal representation, I have a gun.

And I would submit that a hand, an arm -- let me
An unseen hand in a coat pocket, especially

And he could have had

1

his hand in his pocket like this, like Napoleon in his

2

pictures.

I don't believe that would be an indication that he

3

has a gun.

Or if he has his hands in his pockets and they're

4

down loose, not pointing at anything, I don't think that's a

5

representation of anything.

6

When it is up with an arm at almost a 90-degree

7

angle or near there, that's a indication, that's a

8

representation that there is a gun.

9

THE COURT:

10
11

Mr. Peterson, I'll give you the last word if you
want.

12

MR. PETERSON:

13 I
14

Thank you.

Thank you, Judge.

Your Honor, I appreciate the Court's inquiry and
sensitivity to the fine distinctions that we're drawing here.

15

The reason I don't think the representation element

16

is met in this case is partly the fact sensitivity of the time

17

of year.

18

there with a ski parka, with a hand in his pocket you might

19

have more apprehension than you would in the dead of winter,

20

particularly the tough winter that we had here in December.

21

Somebody comes in with a parka on, with their hands --at least

22

one hand, maybe two hands, huddled up inside their coat. I

23

don't know about your Honor, but many times when I have my ski

24

jacket, or other jacket, I put my hands up in the coat and I

25

put my hands up at that very right angle Mr. Bown just

If this were the middle of July and someone is in

1

indicated.

2

gesturing, for that particular time of year, particularly when

3

you're coming in directly from a cold street, which we have at

4

the Gateway Mall, into a store.

5

And that is not an unreasonable position, or

So I'm just suggesting that under the cases that

6

have been decided after the legislative amendment that there

7

needs to be at least some additional language used by

8

Mr. Ireland or the showing of something out of that pocket for

9

there to be a distinction between a first and second-degree

10
11
12
13
14
15

robbery.
THE COURT: All right.

I will let you know within

two weeks, probably or hopefully shorter than that.
Once I have issued my decision, what is the intent
of the parties?
MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, if the Court decides in

16

the State's favor here, I have already executed a Sery plea

17

form that everybody has analyzed and is prepared to sign.

18

the Court rules in our favor that the elements here are only

19

sufficient for a second-degree robbery, I will rewrite the plea

20

form and Mr. Ireland will plead to the second-degree robbery.

21

If

And in that regard, Judge -- I know it doesnrt go to

22

the merits of your decision -- I just want everyone to know

23

Mr. Ireland's intent has been to resolve this case and plead

24

this case out rather than try it.

25

THE COURT:

Thank you.

1

Anything further, Mr. Sown?

2

MR, BOWN:

No, your Honor.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. PETERSON:

Thank you.
Your Honor, either way I go, whoever

5

prevails here will prepare the Findings of Fact and Order for

6

your Honor's signature.

7

it would benefit the Court if I provided you a copy of the

8

transcript.

9

THE COURT:

10

In that regard I ! m wondering whether

If you would like to, that's fine.

MR. PETERSON:

As you analyze your decision situation

11

here.

12

of the transcript, if possible.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. PETERSON:

15

THE COURT:

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

MR. BOWN:

18

THE COURT:

19

on the 29th at 8:30.

20

In that case, I just ask that we have an expedited copy

Are you paying for that?

Fine with me.

Thank you, your Honor.

We'll set it -- if today is the 17th --

MR. PETERSON:
that point, correct?

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. PETERSON:

25

And you want Mr. Ireland brought up at

That will be fine.
Your Honor, is that your regular

Monday law and motion?
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Are we going to have a review date?

21

24

Yes.

Yes.

1

MR. PETERSON:

2

THE COURT:

3

(Proceedings in the above-entitled matter were

4 I

Thank you, Judge.

Thank you.

concluded.)

5
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10 I
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11
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12
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13
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14
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16
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Addendum E

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 031908349

Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND,
Defendant.

This matter was brought before the Court by Motion on March
17, 2004. The State has brought aggravated robbery charges against
defendant William Joseph Ireland, pursuant to Section 76-6-302,
Utah Code Ann.

Mr. Ireland has waived his right to a jury trial,

and intends to enter a guilty plea.

The sole issue before the

Court is whether Mr. Ireland is guilty of a first or second degree
felony. Mr. Ireland is prepared to admit that on December 6, 2003,
he entered Fortier Jewelers located in the Gateway Mall at 11 S.
Rio Grande Street, and demanded jewelry and money from a store
employee.
The testimony of the employee/witness established that the
defendant entered the store with his right hand in his coat pocket.
The coat was described as large and puffy, perhaps a parka. The
defendant's hand was held close to his right side, with the elbow
extending toward the back or behind the defendant.

While the
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defendant's hand was in this position, he told the witness, "I want
you to go and get me all the money in the cash drawer right now."
The witness described the defendant's action as: "There was one
hand in a pocket, gesturing like there was a gun."
11.)

(Hearing Tr. p.

The witness also described the defendant's hand in the

defendant's coat pocket as "pointing at me."

(Hearing Tr. p. 11.)

He further described the defendant's hand as "it was definitely
gesturing like there was a weapon, but it was more subtle."
(Hearing Tr. p. 12.)
the

defendant

had

The witness then testified that he thought
a

weapon based

on

the

motioning

defendant's hand in the defendant's coat pocket.

of

the

(Hearing Tr. p.

13.)'
The witness admitted he did not know whether the defendant had
a gun and that he never saw a gun, but assumed the defendant had a
gun because of the gesturing of the defendant' s hand in the
defendant's coat pocket.

(Hearing Tr. at p. 16.)

Additionally,

the bulge in the defendant's pocket, and the way it looked, pointed
at the witness led the witness to believe the defendant had a
weapon.

(Hearing Tr. at p. 2 7.) At the time of the robbery, the

witness felt that the defendant may have had a weapon in his hand,
and the witness testified that he was afraid that he might be shot
if he did not comply with the defendant's request. (Hearing Tr. at
p. 27.) It was the witness's further impression that the defendant
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intended to make the witness believe that the defendant had a gun
in his pocket; and he did so believe.

(Hearing Tr. at p.28.)

The issue before the Court is whether a nonverbal gesture
constitutes a "representation" of a dangerous weapon pursuant to
Section 76-1-601, Utah Code Ann.

This issue appears to be one of

first impression in the state of Utah.
In State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court overturned an aggravated robbery conviction based on
a prior statute where the defendant had stated, "This is a robbery,
don't turn it into a homicide. Give me all of your money."
962.

Id. at

The defendant approached the teller with his right hand

inside of his coat pocket, which he lifted over the counter.

The

witness testified that, "something was pointing at me in his
pocket."

Jd. at 962.

Based upon those facts and the statute in

effect at the time, the Supreme Court stated that the defendant had
not used a firearm, or a facsimile of a firearm, or a deadly
weapon. Id. at 965 (relying on Utah Code Ann., Section 76-6-302
(1975), which stated that " [a] person commits aggravated robbery if
in the course of committing robbery, he: (a) uses a firearm or a
facsimile of a firearm...or a deadly weapon....").
In

apparent

response

to

the

Suniville

decision,

the

legislature amended Section 76-6-302, Utah Code Ann., which reads
in pertinent part:
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(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in
the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous
weapon....
Section 76-1-601, defines "dangerous weapon" as:
(a) any item capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the
item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent
intended use of the item leads the victim to
reasonably believe the item is likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) The actor represents to the
victim verbally or in any other manner that he
is in control of such an item.
A

review

of

the

case

law

in this

state

since

Suniville

indicates that convictions of defendants have been upheld where a
defendant made a verbal representation that he or she has a gun or
will use a gun or a weapon and the statement is accompanied with a
show of an apparent weapon, that is, a hand in a pocket.
e.g., State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310 (Utah App. 1992).

See,

This Court

must decide whether a representation may be made by a hand and
gestures of the hand absent a verbal representation.

This Court

concludes that the elements of the crime alleged in this case have
been met by the defendant's gestures as set forth above.
In the case before the Court, the witness clearly indicated he
felt the defendant had a weapon. As the Court indicated during the
course of the hearing, it is not fair, reasonable or wise to place
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the burden upon a witness to inquire whether or not a bulge in the
defendant's pocket is or is not a weapon.
It defies logic to allow a defendant to induce a victim to
believe the defendant has a weapon and thereby coerce a victim to
perform some act based on the defendant's representations and then
allow the defendant to benefit when it is later shown the defendant
in fact had no such weapon.

The Court finds in this case that the

defendant's placement of his hand in his pocket and the gesturing
accompanying it, as testified to by the witness, constituted a
representation.

Therefore, the State is within its discretion in

charging this matter as a first degree felony.
Although the statutory language governing aggravated robbery
seems to clearly encompass the defendant's actions, this Court is
further persuaded that the defendant can be charged with aggravated
robbery by the case law of other states interpreting statutes
similar to ours.

Whether a weapon or a facsimile is actually

displayed in the commission of a crime, or a verbal representation
that such a weapon is in the possession of the perpetrator, or
whether the representation is made by menacing gestures, the effect
is the same on the victim. A facsimile of a gun can cause no more
harm than leading one to believe the perpetrator actually has a
gun, whether by word or action.
that found in New York.

The Utah statute is similar to

New York's law reads:
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A person is guilty of robbery in the second
degree if he forcibly steals property and if,
in the course of the commission of the crime
he lf [displays] what appears to be a pistol,
revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun, or
other firearm."
N.Y. Penal Law § 160.10(2) (b) , as quoted in People v. Knowles, 436
N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1981).

The Supreme Court appellate division

of New York held in Knowles:
We hold today that if a person who is in fact
unarmed commits a robbery and, in the course
thereof, positions his hand in his pocket in a
manner that is intended to convey to his
victim the impression that he is holding a
firearm, that said person has committed
robbery in the second degree within the
meaning of the statute quoted above.
436 N.Y.2d at 25.
Delaware's statute is also similar to Utah's, and in State v.
Lawrence, 2001 Del. Super. Lexis 318 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28,
2001),

afffd, 790 A.2d 476

(Del. 2002),

held that the term

"displays" included a defendant's act of wrapping a cloth around
his hand so that it appeared to hide a gun, and where the victim
reasonably felt- that the defendant was armed.
The facts of this case are very similar to Deleon v. Arkansas,
1989 Ark. App., Lexis 608 (1999) , which interpreted another statute
much like Utah's.

In Deleon, the defendant entered a convenience

store to purchase a pack of cigarettes, and stated to the clerk,
"Would you mind filling me up a sack?"

Id. at *2. As the clerk
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reached for a bag, he noticed that the man had his hand in his
pocket. Id. The clerk testified, "I figured he had a weapon in his
pocket or a gun."

Id.

The Court of Appeals of Arkansas stated

that when the defendant put his hand in his pocket, he did so "for
the purpose of inducing the belief that he was armed with a deadly
weapon and that although he used no threatening words [as to the
use of a weapon] , his conduct had the desired effect upon the
victim," who perceived the defendant's actions to be menacing or
threatening.

Id. at *4.

This Court believes that the reasoning of these cases is sound
and consistent with the terms of Utah's revised statute, and
concludes that
threatening

"representation"

gestures

includes not only words, but

and movements which would

indicate

the

defendant is in possession of a dangerous weapon.
The State's filing of this action as a first degree felony is
upheld.
The State is to prepare the approprJ^t^E.indings, Conclusions
and an Order.
Lday of April,

PAUL G\*l

DISTRICT:CpU£;r^
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